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No pay, no care? A case study exploring motivations
for participation in payments for ecosystem services
in Uganda
J A N E T F I S H E R
Abstract A key question in the literature on payments for
ecosystem services (PES) is how payments incentivize
conservation action and, in particular, how they interact
with other motivations, including motivations for environ-
mental stewardship. Related to this question are concerns
about the temporal sustainability of PES: what happens
when payments cease and whether a ‘no pay, no care’
environmental ethic is fostered. I present empirical research
from a case study in western Uganda, where forest-adjacent
communities are paid in exchange for planting trees on
private lands, for carbon sequestration. The study demon-
strates the range of values people have for trees in the
landscape and the range of motivations for participating in
PES schemes. However, the analysis shows that payments
are clearly the main motivation for involvement, except in
one area where people are more motivated by aesthetic and
existence values for trees. Given the widespread importance
of money in motivating involvement, I investigate the
proﬁtability of participation over time. This proﬁtability
analysis, in combination with qualitative data on percep-
tions of, and plans for, the future, contributes to under-
standing the temporal sustainability of PES. I draw on
various strands of evidence to argue that the way
participants prioritize payments may constitute a threat to
the long-term maintenance of PES activities, particularly in
situations such as in this case study, in which there is a
mismatch between payments and contract length.
Keywords Direct payments, environmental values, incent-
ives, motivation, participation, payments for ecosystem
services, PES, temporal sustainability
Introduction
Sommerville et al. (2009) argued that the use of positiveincentives is the guiding philosophy of payments for
ecosystem services (PES) and conditionality the means of
inﬂuencing behaviour. Whilst a variety of incentives have
been used in PES schemes, monetary incentives (henceforth
payments) are considered to maintain conditionality most
directly, as they are amenable to adjustment according to
performance (Milne & Niesten, 2009). However, little
empirical work on PES has considered the importance of
payments in motivating participation.
In examinations of motivations for participation in
PES schemes it has been found that payments often do not
cover opportunity costs (Kosoy et al., 2007; Sommerville
et al., 2010; Van Hecken & Bastiaensen, 2010). This
challenges what Pagiola et al. (2005) call prima facie
evidence that voluntary PES schemes are of net monetary
beneﬁt to participants. In cases where the payment does not
play a decisive role, other factors must be important. In a
Madagascan example, behavioural changes were motivated
more by fear of sanction than by a desire to increase the
community payment (Sommerville et al., 2010). There is
also evidence that perceived non-monetary beneﬁts of
PES schemes include improved land tenure security and
community organization, and the perception that such
schemes will increase the visibility of participants to
assistance from government or non-government bodies
(Wunder, 2007; Kosoy et al., 2008). Hence, motivations for
involvement in PES schemes do not reduce to a purely
monetary rationale and environmental values interplay with
other motivations (Kosoy et al., 2008).
Many authors have highlighted the possibility that
intrinsic environmental motivations may be crowded out
by incentives (Corbera et al., 2007; Sommerville et al., 2009;
Pattanayak et al., 2010; Van Hecken & Bastiaensen, 2010).
However, investigating this empirically is constrained by
two methodological challenges, which may explain why
Vatn (2010) considers the issue to be under-researched.
Firstly, research on crowding out relies on understanding
environmental values and motivations in communities that
receive payments. Research of this nature is grounded in
Western cultural constructs and relies on elicitation
methods such as statement ranking, which are challenging
to apply across linguistic and cultural settings. The second
challenge relates to time-scales. To examine whether PES
crowds out other values one would ideally employ a
longitudinal research design, including the ability to
determine causality of outcomes. Hence, to the extent that
the issue of crowding out has been addressed in the
literature on PES, it has been through inference from more
generic research in psychology and economics on
the interaction between extrinsic rewards and intrinsic
motivations. In a meta-analysis Deci et al. (1999) found
that rewards typically reduce intrinsic motivations, even
when rewarding performance, as they tend to preclude
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self-regulation. Frey & Jegen (2001) drew similar lessons
from the economics literature and considered these ﬁndings
to apply across cultures. Reviewing literature on behavioural
economics experiments, Bowles (2008) found that occasion-
ally rewards complement ethical motives but in many
situations rewards erode and displace these. Hence, con-
cerns about PES crowding out pre-existing environmental
motivations are founded in empirical work elsewhere.
This possibility of crowding out has important implica-
tions for the temporal sustainability of PES schemes and
whether payments foster an attitude of ‘no pay, no care’
(in the words of Swart, 2003). Engel et al. (2008) and
Pattanayak et al. (2010) found no reason why the service will
be provided after payments end, although this assumes that
livelihood strategies have not been signiﬁcantly altered.
Payment for ecosystem services targeting carbon sequestra-
tion have particular implications in this regard as the
permanence criterion requires long contract time-scales,
which are challenging for participants to honour (Wunder
& Albán, 2008). Here I address two linked questions:
(1) Where do payments feature amongst a range of
motivations to participate in PES schemes, and how do
motivations interact with environmental values? (2) What
implications do motivations for participation have for the
temporal sustainability of PES schemes? I examine these
questions using a range of social science methods in a case
study of PES in western Uganda, where forest-adjacent
communities are paid for planting trees for carbon
sequestration.
To address the ﬁrst question I report on the importance
of payments in motivating participation, relative to other
motivations, including values for trees in the landscape. The
research rests on the premise that values are one factor
underpinning motivations. Environmental values are un-
derstood through a conventional framework of use (direct,
indirect and option values) and non-use (bequest, existence
and altruistic values). To investigate the second question a
proﬁtability analysis is used to consider the ﬂows of beneﬁts
from trees over time, complemented by qualitative research
on intentions and norms around tree harvesting. This leads
to an empirically-based understanding of temporal sustain-
ability in PES schemes.
Case study: Trees for Global Benefit
Trees for Global Beneﬁt is a carbon forestry PES scheme in
Bushenyi District, western Uganda, in three administrative
areas: Bitereko, Kiyanga and Bunyaruguru (Fig. 1). Bushenyi
has a relatively high population density, with 208 people
per km2 compared to the national average of 124 (Local
Government, 2009). In this district typical agricultural
land uses are the staple matoke (bananas) and other cash
(e.g. coﬀee, tea, potato) and subsistence crops. Eucalyptus
stands are common among the wealthy who tend to have
surplus land. Forests comprise 20% of the district area
(Local Government, 2009), the majority designated as
Central Forest Reserves, managed primarily for conserva-
tion. Bunyaruguru borders the access points to Queen
Elizabeth National Park, with beneﬁt-sharing arrangements
in some communities through the Uganda Wildlife
Authority. Although collaborative forest management is
being developed in Bunyaruguru, those communities not
involved in this have little access to the Park or Forest
Reserves, except variable and informal access for collecting
ﬁrewood. Hence, forests do not play a large part in what are
predominantly agricultural livelihoods.
Trees for Global Beneﬁt began in 2002 and is managed
by Ecotrust, a Ugandan conservation NGO, using the Plan
Vivo system for aﬀorestation carbon (Plan Vivo, 2010a).
Participants plant indigenous trees on private land, in
woodlots or agroforestry systems. Most non-state land in the
region is privately owned, under customary recognition.
Intercropping is allowed in early years but not possible after
canopy closure. Participants enter into a contract with
Ecotrust, also signed by their family. Each participant is
allocated a tonnage price of carbon dioxide in USD, from
which an administration percentage (typically c. 40%;
Ecotrust, 2009) is deducted. Of the remaining sum, a
further 10% risk buﬀer is deducted. Participants are
monitored and paid a percentage of the remaining ﬁnance
according to the targets in Table 1. Project activities are
dispersed over a large area and , 1% of the resident
population participate.
The project sells ex ante carbon credits that are ‘planned
or forecasted but have not yet been achieved’ (Kollmuss
et al., 2008; 104). This is common to Plan Vivo projects,
the argument being that initial ﬁnancing is necessary for
plantation establishment, and hence necessary for the
additionality of the sequestered carbon (Plan Vivo, 2010b).
Related to the ex ante arrangements, payments are front-
loaded, disbursed in the ﬁrst 10 years, rather than spread
over the contract length of 25 years. At the time of data
collection no-one had been participating for . 6 years.
During the 10-year payment period non-compliance is
sanctioned by withholding future payments. Project
implementers currently have no plans for sanctioning
non-compliance after the 10-year payment period. Timber
is the property of the participant. Contracts are heritable
and there are examples of land under contract being
transacted.
Methods
The research methods used were in-depth interviews,
beneﬁt-ranking exercises and economic modelling. The
random sample included 81 respondents (43% of total
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participants), whose characteristics are presented in Table 2.
Interviews were conducted with the contract holder, or
their spouse in the few cases when the holder was un-
available. A semi-structured interview was used to elicit in-
depth perspectives on motivations, environmental values
and future perspectives. This means that when proportions
of responses are reported, they derive from open questions.
Nearby forests provided a useful basis for asking open
questions to elicit expressions of environmental value. Many
associations with the forest were similar to those made with
trees on farms. Planting trees is also closely associated with
environmental stewardship, making perspectives on tree
planting a useful entry point to understand values. The
research therefore adopted a broad approach to under-
standing perspectives towards trees in the landscape, in
forests and on farms. To understand questions associated
with temporal sustainability and the lifespan of trees,
interviews incorporated scenario questions about strategies
respondents would use if they needed cash urgently.
Ranking exercises were used as a method to derive
ordinally ranked quantitative data that could be triangulated
against qualitative information to understand the
FIG. 1 The three administrative areas (Bitereko, Kiyanga and Bunyaruguru) of Bushenyi District where the carbon forestry PES scheme
Trees for Global Beneﬁt is taking place, with the location of forests and gazetted areas, including Queen Elizabeth National Park. The
rectangle on the inset indicates the location of the main map in western Uganda.
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importance of money in relation to other beneﬁts of project
participation that accrue to the household. Focus groups
were used to establish a list of beneﬁts of participation at the
household level: beauty of the environment (partly accruing
at the household, partly a public good), ‘carbon money’,
control of soil erosion, ﬁrewood, fruits, manure (speciﬁcally,
that leaves of trees contribute nutrients to the soil),
medicine, poles, shade, timber and windbreaks.
Respondents were asked to rank cards (in Runyankore,
the local language) in response to the instruction ‘please
rank these factors according to their importance in why you
joined the project’. Each respondent who had received at
least one payment (56 in total) completed a beneﬁt-ranking
exercise. Some new participants had not received payment
because of administrative delays. To investigate the
importance of money as a motivation it would not have
been legitimate to compare the beneﬁt-ranking exercises of
those who had with those who had not been paid. For
analysis, these data are disaggregated into groups based on
administrative area, gender and wealth (derived from an
index based on 12 indicators; Fisher, 2011). To test the
signiﬁcance of the diﬀerences in median ranking between
respondents grouped on the basis of area, gender and
wealth, I used the Kruskal-Wallis test. This test is the non-
parametric equivalent of the ANOVA, applicable to data
derived from an ordinal ranking exercise.
Economic modelling to understand proﬁtability builds
on work by Owen (2003) at the inception of the project.
Seven typical land-use scenarios are modelled with diﬀerent
combinations of trees and crops, for a hypothetical hectare
of land, over 25 years (commensurate with the PES
contract). Scenarios are detailed in Table 3. Input costs
(variable according to land use) and revenues of harvests
were used to model cash ﬂow each year, using Owen’s
ﬁgures, corroborated with data from focus groups. Harvest
costs of crops are absorbed by the farmer and that of timber
are absorbed by the buyer. Inherent simpliﬁcations
include no account being taken of variability in yields (e.g.
environmental factors) or variability in price (e.g. micro-
economic factors). Discount rates (the percentage rate by
which the value of a cash ﬂow is reduced for each time
period by which it is removed from the present) were
applied to cash ﬂow ﬁgures to calculate a net present value
(NPV) for each land-use scenario. Because discount rates
are subjective, and related to wealth (Lumley, 1997), four
rates are used (5, 10, 15 and 25%), from which sensitivity to
discounting can be established. This modelling exercise is
intended to be heuristic, yielding indicative rather than
precise values.
Results
Environmental values and trees in the landscape
In response to open questions eliciting perspectives on trees
in the landscape c. 75% of respondents made associations
between trees and ecosystem services, particularly rainfall,
soil fertility, fresh air and shade. Most commonly, trees are
thought to bring localized rain and they are highly valued
accordingly. Soil fertility was also highly valued, associated
with land bordering the forest, or with indigenous trees
on farms. Although not as prevalent as these use values,
respondents also expressed non-use existence and bequeath
values. A few respondents talked about being enriched
near the forest, enjoying seeing trees ‘swaying in the wind’
or charismatic mammals. Some advocated the reservation
of a place for nature, separate from humans, or perceived
a creation value in nature. Most prevalent amongst
expressions of non-use values, however, was the sense that
forest protection and trees on farms have bequeath value, to
secure Uganda’s natural heritage and suﬃcient rainfall for
future generations.
Despite these positive perspectives about trees, a quarter
of interviews contained the sense that conditions were worse
with higher forest cover, associated with a poorer and more
isolated past. Further negative associations were made with
crop-raiding, a major source of discontent and loss of
livelihood for forest-adjacent communities. These positive
and negative, and use and non-use, environmental values
provide the context within which motivations for particip-
ating in a tree-planting PES scheme can be understood.
Understanding motivations to participate in the project
Table 4 shows that payment (carbon money) is the beneﬁt
with the highest median ranking and therefore forms the
most important direct motivation. Fig. 2 shows that carbon
money was ranked ﬁrst by 28/56 (50%) of respondents who
had been paid. Evidence that corroborates the ranking is the
TABLE 1 Schedule of percentage payments, and indicative
payments in Ugandan Shillings (UGX) and USD, based on a
typical 1-ha plantation. Payments are made according to the
conditions of the plantation.
Year Condition of plantation
%
payment UGX USD*
0 50% established 30 395,640 181.5
1 100% established 20 263,760 121.0
3 85% survival of number
of trees registered
20 263,760 121.0
5 Minimum 10-cm diameter
breast height
10 131,880 60.5
10 Mean 20-cm diameter
breast height
20 263,760 121.0
Total 1,318,800 605.0
*USD 15UGX 2,180 (OANDA, 2010)
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fact that few are growing non-fruit indigenous trees other
than through involvement in the project, suggesting that
without payment growing indigenous trees is ﬁnancially
inviable. Similarly, c. 60% of interviews highlighted the
importance of the payment.
People do have other uses for trees beyond carbon
money, and the importance of these varies with diﬀerences
in local environmental factors and access to the forest. In all
communities, to varying extents, there was a shortage of
timber and wood products and these were a signiﬁcant
motivation for participants, with timber ranked second
overall (Table 4). There were also important motivations in
the land improvement beneﬁts of indigenous trees, for soil
productivity, structure and to mitigate soil erosion (ranked
third).
Social factors also motivate involvement. A legacy of
interventions in the area, dating from the colonial era, have
encouraged tree planting (Carswell, 2003). The inﬂuence
of environmental leadership is also clear; local project
advocates are a source of environmental information and
encouragement. Participants are also clustered, suggesting
that people are prompted by neighbours to change land use.
Furthermore, where the project has used existing groups
TABLE 2 Project participant and research respondent characteristics according to administrative area (Fig. 1) and gender.
Area Total no. of participants No. of research respondents
Bitereko 64 (inc. 27 female contract holders) 31 (16 male; 15 female)
Kiyanga 68 (inc. 9 female contract holders) 25 (18 male; 7 female*)
Bunyaruguru 56 (inc. 8 female contract holders) 25 (21 male; 4 female*)
Total 188 81 (43% total)
*Female contract holders were purposively, rather than randomly, sampled in Kiyanga and Bunyaruguru. As females participate in smaller numbers they
would have been poorly represented in a random sample and the research sought to understand gendered dimensions of motivations for participation.
TABLE 3 Seven land-use scenarios in the proﬁtability modelling
exercise, with details of each scenario.
Land-use scenario Details
A, Indigenous timber
without carbon revenues
400 stems ha−1 (typical density for
carbon project; 5-m spacing). Based
on Maesopsis timber (planted by
majority). Assumes full survival of
trees, legitimate given ﬁnal
payment conditional on this.
Incorporates intercropping in years
0 and 1 (assumes trees outcompete
crops later).
B, Indigenous timber
with carbon revenues
Spacing and tree details as above.
Carbon revenues calculated, with
payments made in years 0, 1, 3, 5,
10. Full survival of trees assumed.
Incorporates intercropping in years
0 and 1 (as above).
C, Eucalyptus managed
for poles
Two, 12.5-year rotations, managed
for poles. Dense plantations (2-m
spacing). Harvest 50% at 8 years
(and 20.5 years) and remaining
50% at 12.5 years (and 25 years).
Full survival of trees assumed.
D, Eucalyptus managed
for timber
25-year rotation, managed for
timber trees (3-m spacing). Full
survival of trees assumed.
E, Mixed crops (coﬀee,
matoke, maize, beans)
Assume 0.25 ha of each crop and all
crops sold for cash
F, Coﬀee Assume new planting: no yield until
4 years, continual yield
subsequently (Purseglove, 1968)
G, Matoke Assume new planting: no yield until
18 months, continual yield
subsequently (Purseglove, 1968)
TABLE 4 Beneﬁts of project participation ranked according to
median rank for whole dataset (n5 56).
1, Carbon money
2, Timber
3, Control of soil erosion, manure, ﬁrewood (tied)
4, Medicine, beauty of the environment (tied)
5, Fruits
6, Shade
7, Poles
8, Windbreak
30
25
20
15
10
Fr
eq
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nc
y
5
0
1 2 3 4 5
Rank position
6 7 8 9 10 11
FIG. 2 Frequency with which carbon money appears in each
rank position in the ranking exercise that measures the relative
importance of beneﬁts of PES participation (n5 56).
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such as women’s associations, participation has spread from
peer to peer.
Disaggregrating the ranked data spatially demonstrates
diﬀerences between Bunyaruguru and the other two
administrative areas, in which ranking results were similar
(Table 5). Carbon money is ranked lower in Bunyaruguru.
The Kruskal–Wallis test (Table 6) shows that this result is
statistically signiﬁcant: people in Bunyaruguru are signiﬁc-
antly less motivated by payment. The higher placement
of beauty of the environment in Bunyaruguru fell just
short of statistical signiﬁcance. This diﬀerence in motiva-
tions points to diﬀerentmediators of environmental value in
Bunyaruguru, something also evident in qualitative data: of
nine instances of the expression of existence values for trees,
eight were from Bunyaruguru.
Analysing profitability
Given the importance of money in motivating participation
it is of interest to consider how participants assess the
monetary costs and beneﬁts of participation, i.e. proﬁt-
ability. To frame the proﬁtability modelling I present ﬁrstly
some analysis of participants’ economic rationale. Most
individuals are neither proﬁt-maximising nor making
rigorous calculations about the proﬁtability of land use
over time. Only 11% of participants reported calculating
the proﬁtability of the carbon strategy compared to other
land uses. A much higher percentage (43%) reported that
although they hadn’t calculated anything, they were
motivated by the future beneﬁts of the project, often citing
timber. The remainder (46%) said they had made no
calculation, just planted. Ecotrust is an established and
trusted NGO in these communities and respondents
sometimes conveyed the assumption that Trees for Global
Beneﬁt is a benevolent development project whose activities
are necessarily beneﬁcial.
Wider observational and experimental economics evid-
ence (e.g. Frank, 1987; Pattanayak et al., 2010) render
untenable the assumption that people act rationally to
maximize proﬁt. Given this, and the results reported above,
the proﬁtability analysis is not presented here as if it
resembles most participants’ rationale. Yet it remains one
part of understanding motivation, and opens up important
questions around beneﬁt ﬂows over time, useful to under-
stand the second research question. I ﬁrst consider the
impact of carbon revenues on planting timber trees. A
discount rate of 10% returns a 15% increase in net present
value (Table 7); i.e. growing indigenous timber is 15% more
proﬁtable with carbon revenues. This is a relatively modest
increase, and the minor scale of carbon to timber revenues,
even expressed as NPV (timber discounted) is clear from
Fig. 3. However, in prioritizing the carbon money
many appear to consider that carbon revenue raises the
TABLE 5 Beneﬁts of project participation, ranked according to median rank in Bunyaruguru compared with median rank of combined data
from Bitereko and Kiyanga.
Data from Bunyaruguru (including only those
who had been paid, n5 16*)
Combined data from Bitereko + Kiyanga (including only those
who had been paid, n5 40)
1, Timber, beauty of the environment, manure (tied) 1, Carbon money
2, Control of soil erosion 2, Timber
3, Carbon money 3, Firewood, manure (tied)
4, Medicine 4, Control of soil erosion, medicine (tied)
5, Shade, ﬁrewood, fruits (tied) 5, Fruits, beauty of the environment (tied)
6, Poles 6, Poles, shade (tied)
7, Windbreak 7, Windbreak
*This is a relatively small sample size, although the Kruskal–Wallis statistical test returns signiﬁcant results (Table 6). If those who had not been paid are
included (n5 25) beauty of the environment remains in the same place but carbonmoney is lower, although still signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from comparable data
in Bitereko and Kiyanga.
TABLE 6 Results of Kruskal–Wallis test (K ) for signiﬁcance of
diﬀerences between groups based on administrative area, gender
and wealth in the ranking of beneﬁts of project participation. K and
P refer to the eﬀect of area, gender and wealth on the median
rankings for each grouping. In the case of a statistically signiﬁcant P
value (< 0.05) one infers which group is statistically signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from the sample by comparing the median rankings of
diﬀerent groups.
Beneﬁt
Area Gender Wealth
K P K P K P
Beauty of the
environment
5.81 0.055 0.28 0.597 4.07 0.397
Carbon money 9.94 0.007 10.44 0.001 2.70 0.609
Control of soil
erosion
2.66 0.264 0.27 0.603 2.71 0.607
Firewood 3.98 0.137 0.13 0.718 3.18 0.528
Fruits 0.66 0.719 0.09 0.764 5.26 0.262
Manure 0.04 0.980 1.25 0.264 3.69 0.450
Medicine 2.31 0.315 2.1 0.147 6.46 0.167
Poles 0.22 0.896 0.68 0.410 8.24 0.083
Shade 7.15 0.028 5.32 0.021 0.61 0.962
Timber 3.58 0.167 0.32 0.572 0.74 0.946
Windbreak 0.05 0.975 0.72 0.396 1.16 0.885
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proﬁtability more highly, suggesting they discount the
future at a rate exceeding 10%. Table 7 demonstrates a
general point that high returns in the distant future make
the timber scenarios very sensitive to discounting. Under
high discount rates, front-loaded carbon revenues balance
favourably against future timber revenues. I reﬂect below on
the relationship between poverty and discounting.
Considering the relative proﬁtability of diﬀerent land
uses, represented by the numbered ranking (square brackets
in Table 7), coﬀee is the most proﬁtable under anything
but a 5% discount rate. This is well triangulated with
observations that many grow coﬀee, and a third report
coﬀee as their most proﬁtable land use. Yet in this analysis
carbon trees are the most proﬁtable strategy under a very
low (5%) discount rate, and are relatively proﬁtable under
10 and 15% rates. Hence, for those who can overcome
barriers to entry, and those who do not discount the
future too highly, growing trees for carbon sequestration
provides a relatively proﬁtable alternative. This alternative
is particularly attractive on steep land, or because of crop
failure (mentioned by 1/5 of respondents). Clearly, there
is also value in diversifying land use and reducing risk
exposure.
How do people consider the future?
The proﬁtability analysis raises questions regarding how
participants evaluate the future. Indigenous trees are viewed
as an investment but nobody grows them other than
through involvement in the project. Many reported that the
time-scales are too long, and this view is shared by local
forestry oﬃcials and Owen (2003).
A few respondents object that Trees for Global Beneﬁt
governs their land use for 25 years and are concerned about
passing contractual obligations to their children. In contrast,
16% of interviews conveyed an appreciation of the way Trees
for Global Beneﬁt encourages planning on longer time-
scales than other programmes such as agricultural exten-
sion. Nearly a third talked unprompted about being
motivated partly because they saw future timber revenues
as insurance and a valuable inheritance for their children.
When asked how long they intend to keep the trees,
most respondents stated c. 25 years but there is confusion
about the contract length. Broader community norms give
insight into harvesting time-scales. Approximately half
report that trees are often harvested prematurely, particu-
larly Eucalyptus, which is seen as a renewable resource.
Respondents often associated harvesting with necessity,
saying it tended to be prompted by urgent requirements for
building materials or money. A ﬁfth reported a community
perception that it is foolish to harvest early but there is
a strong sense of individual responsibility over private
land, which was presented by respondents as overriding
community land management norms.
TABLE 7 Proﬁtability (in 1,000s of UGX, where 2,180 UGX5USD 1; OANDA, 2010) of the seven land-use scenarios (Table 3) under
discount rates of 5, 10, 15 and 25%. All values are in net present value for 1 ha for a period of 25 years. Numbered ranking in square brackets
indicates the descending proﬁtability of the seven land-use scenarios.
Land-use scenario/discount rate 5% 10% 15% 25%
A, Indigenous timber without carbon revenues 21,534 [2] 6,834 [3] 2,356 [6] 435 [6]
B, Indigenous timber with carbon revenues (% increase with
carbon; (B-A)/A)
22,674 [1]
(5%)
7,851 [2]
(15%)
3,285 [2]
(39%)
1,248 [4]
(187%)
C, Eucalyptus managed for poles 9,943 [5] 4,920 [4] 2,603 [4] 732 [5]
D, Eucalyptus managed for timber 14,153 [4] 4,062 [5] 997 [7] −302 [7]
E, Mixed crops (coﬀee, Matoke, maize, beans) 6,437 [6] 3,957 [6] 2,680 [3] 1,495 [3]
F, Coﬀee 15,380 [3] 9,143 [1] 5,954 [1] 3,034 [1]
G, Matoke 5,786 [7] 3,663 [7] 2,558 [5] 1,509 [2]
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FIG. 3 Net present value of indigenous timber scenarios (without
and with carbon revenues) with a discount rate of 10% over 25
years.
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In response to questions about strategies if money is
urgently required, participants talked of liquidating live-
stock or land assets, or loaning money through social
networks. They also mentioned harvesting trees, saying
these could be liquidized quickly. Despite this being a
sensitive matter, which may not be expected to be reported
in an interview, two respondents talked of their strategic
engagement with the project, planning to break the
contract and harvest trees if a more lucrative option became
available.
Discussion
I used a diverse and novel combination of methods to
consider questions of howmotivations for participation in a
PES scheme relates to environmental values, and in turn
what this means for temporal sustainability of PES schemes.
I now review the empirical ﬁndings and reﬂect on their
implications, including for implementation. One lesson
relates to mismatches between time-scales and payments,
and another to the potential advantages of PES within a
suite of interventions.
In Bushenyi District most respondents conveyed
strong perceived beneﬁts of trees in the landscape, relating
to rainfall generation, cooler microclimates, soil fertility and
tree products. Some non-use environmental values were
also expressed, particularly in Bunyaruguru. All of these
provide motivations for participation in a tree-planting PES
scheme in addition to social motivations and collective
perceived beneﬁts of the presence of a project. However, at
the household level, payments are clearly the highest
motivation in Bitereko and Kiyanga. This is not a surprising
ﬁnding. Part of the rationale for PES is the power that
payments are likely to have for rural people in the tropics
(Ferraro, 2001). However, payments appear to be particu-
larly appealing when made at a household level; money was
apparently less important in cases with collective payments
(Kosoy et al., 2007; Sommerville et al., 2010; Van Hecken
& Bastiaensen, 2010). Hence, these ﬁndings have greatest
relevance for PES schemes using individual payments on
private lands.
The way in which payments generally dominate other
motivations raises questions of temporal sustainability,
particularly given that payments last 10 years and contracts
25 years. Many are motivated to participate by a desire to
build an inheritance for their children. Yet there is a danger,
demonstrated by the economic modelling, that front-loaded
payments provide a lure to participate when the contract
may not be advantageous if the future is discounted. In
particular, poorer participants, with higher discount rates
(Lumley, 1997; but see also Moseley, 2001), will tend to
prioritize carbon revenues, whether or not time-scales of
timber returns are advantageous for them. This is of
concern for the 20% of participants who are relatively poor
(Fisher, 2011). More broadly, however, front-loading has
implications for temporal sustainability. Trees are regularly
harvested prematurely in Bushenyi and respondents clearly
link tree lifespans to the household asset portfolio. The
implementer has limited power of sanction beyond 10 years,
and there is a 15-year period in which there are no monetary
beneﬁts from the trees and few other beneﬁts. It would
therefore seem reasonable to conclude that the age of tree
harvest will relate closely to the dynamics of the local
timber market as well as household livelihood stability.
The uncertainty surrounding the trees is compounded by
exogenous drivers of land use and microeconomic change,
including the planned exploitation of oil in the Albertine
Rift and population growth and associated land shortage.
Whilst intangibles such as these could aﬀect any interven-
tion, they highlight particular questions about the wisdom
of PES based on ex ante payments and long contracts. In
response to questions about the sustainability of the
payment/contract mismatch, implementers tend to assume
that the money is not a signiﬁcant motivation for
participants (Nantongo, 2008; Plan Vivo 2010c; JF, unpubl.
data). However, this research challenges that assumption.
A clear argument emerges for designing payment
systems in synchrony with ecosystem service provision.
This also presents to participants a more realistic appraisal
of the proﬁtability of the strategy, without front-loaded
incentives. This is particularly important given that this, and
other research (Kosoy et al., 2008), show that participants
in PES schemes do not necessarily consider the suitability
of their involvement and may participate for a variety of
reasons, including trust in the implementer. Synchronizing
payments with ecosystem service provision would also
mean that unrealistic time-scales of obligations are not
conferred on participants in areas of the world with
relatively high social and environmental dynamism. This
is a key challenge for policies designed for reducing
emissions from deforestation and degradation.
Whilst payments have been shown to be a very important
motivation generally, this is less so in Bunyaruguru. Ranked
and qualitative data from Bunyaruguru show that people are
less motivated by money and more likely to express non-use
environmental values and aesthetic preferences for trees in
the landscape. As such, there are indications that project
trees may be maintained for longer in Bunyaruguru. These
evident diﬀerences in Bunyaruguru could be explained by
physical or institutional characteristics or average wealth.
Bunyaruguru has a more forested landscape than the
other two areas (Fig. 1) and people there are generally closer
to forests, especially compared to Bitereko. This could
explain why they are more disposed towards trees; perhaps,
for example, they see more ecosystem service beneﬁts. In
addition, the long-standing presence of Queen Elizabeth
National Park may have led to a higher degree of
environmental pride in the area, perhaps reinforced by
52 J. A. Fisher
© 2012 Fauna & Flora International, Oryx, 46(1), 45–54
http://journals.cambridge.org
tourism and beneﬁt-sharing. Collaborative forest manage-
ment is taking place in Bunyaruguru but it would be diﬃcult
to argue that this is a major inﬂuence as it involves few
communities and had been happening for , 3 years.
However, wider evidence does suggest that collaborative
forest management fosters ownership and motivations for
protection (Chhatre & Agrawal, 2009).
It is plausible that wealthier respondents are more
likely to express non-use environmental values (Inglehart,
1995), and possible that wealth diﬀerences lie behind
results from Bunyaruguru. However, the Kruskal–Wallis
test showed no signiﬁcant eﬀects of wealth on the rankings
of any beneﬁt (Table 7). This may well be because there are
few comparatively poor project participants. Furthermore,
participants in Bunyaruguru are of comparable mean wealth
to participants in Bitereko, with both areas wealthier than
Kiyanga (Fisher, 2011). Diﬀerences between Bunyaruguru
and Bitereko could not therefore be explained by wealth.
Hence, wealth is tentatively discounted as a factor but it is
likely that the explanation lies in the interplay between the
proximity of the forest and the institutional arrangements of
the Park and collaborative forest management.
This case study therefore suggests that communities with
higher non-use environmental values may not prioritize
incentives so highly. According to the PES logic of eﬃciency
this means that the incentive is not well targeted, as
participants may undertake the activity with less or no
payment (cf. Wunder, 2007). However, another implication
is that PES within a suite of interventions (e.g. collaborative
forest management and engagement with a protected area,
as in the case of Bunyaruguru) could lead to a more
temporally sustainable set of environmental motivations.
Petheram & Campbell (2010) advocated this model of PES
within a suite of interventions and Clements et al. (2010)
showed that integrated PES interventions may be more
enduring.
A signiﬁcant part of the appeal of PES is the potential
for sustainable ﬁnance, dubbed the ‘Holy Grail’ by Ferraro
& Kiss (2002). Yet, my ﬁndings demonstrate empirical
evidence for concerns about ‘no pay, no care’ (Swart, 2003),
showing that PES may be less temporally sustainable than
more integrated interventions unless payments are main-
tained in perpetuity, which is an unrealistic expectation.
Discussions of temporal sustainability in PES have thus far
remained partial and speculative. By exploring the limita-
tions of payments in a substantive way, I hope this article
will stimulate discussion and further research about the
legacy of values andmotivations that payments leave in their
wake.
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